MRO FOR LAND SYSTEMS IN INDIAN ARMY

MRO FOR LAND SYSTEMS IN INDIAN ARMY

Background

MRO stands as an acronym of Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul as well as Maintenance & Repair Operations. In either of these constructs, it covers the entire range of war fighting but unfortunately has been relegated to routine activity that too somewhere at one of the lowermost steps of the ladder of conflict winning spectrum. Besides being an important constituent of achieving mission accomplishment in form of provision of mission reliable equipment, neither the commanders have realised the real operational relevance of MRO nor the advisors have succeeded to highlight and impress upon the same. 

When an attack operation is planned and  requisite quantum of fire support is not available, either the attack plan is modified or alternate options of requisite fire support are ensured. Now just imagine if two guns of a fire unit (six guns constituting a conventional fire unit (FU)) are off road for multiple reasons related to MRO, be it repair need, be it non availability of desired oils/lubricants, be it non availability of spares or to that extent, even be it non availability of skilled HR and many more such conditions, one third of FU is non effective  which will have major operational impact. Somehow, the capacity of a proficient MRO to ensure regular availability of mission reliable equipment has not been seen with operational connect view point and therefore due thought and importance of this very subject has been largely missing in our defence forces.

It is very important that we understand the strategic importance of MRO as only then suitable response/restructuring matrix can be planned. Ironically, we haven’t fought full spectrum war since our independence and majority of them were terminated without achieving their aims from the either side. For example 1947-48 war (22 Oct 1947-05 Jan 1949) stopped before India could get entire J&K, 1962 war (20 Oct-20 Nov62) terminated due to unilateral withdrawal by China albeit not to the locations where it was as on 08 Sep 1962, 1965 war (05 Aug 65-23 Sep 65) ended after the ceasefire was declared through UN resolution & 1999 Kargil war ( 03 May-26 Jul 1999) terminated due to Pakistan’s unconditional  withdrawal. 1971 war was the only exception.

A closer analysis of all these conflicts will reveal that the conflicts did not run their full course whereas the current conflict possibility with China & Pakistan’s collusive approach will invariably result in  a lengthier and deadly course wherein the mission reliability of the equipment will become a key component to win the battles. In earlier battles also, the equipments did not function optimally  as quality MRO support was neither structured nor its operational connect was fully realized. MRO, which also encompasses the supply chain of spares as well as other ingredients, needs to be seen as a ‘strategic resource’ as not only the ‘force generation’ but the ‘equipment generation’ under battlefield conditions will become critical given the emerging world order and need of ‘in situ’ repair of the majority of equipment specially when there is so much diversity in the equipment profile of the Army.

MRO challenges of Air Force and Navy are not as complex as that of Army. In case of Air Force, the aircraft has to return to some ‘Base’, where quality MRO support  can be provided, though, there are challenges related to precision, complexity, expertise and spare provisioning besides other issues. Indian Navy also has majority of its components on ship as a platform wherein requisite MRO support can be carried ‘on board’ while some will have to be done once the ships sail back to the shore where all expert MRO support can be created. Unlike these, the challenges in case of provisioning of MRO for the ‘Land Systems’ are too complex as the battle terrain both with China and Pakistan (specially the LOC segment) are high altitude, mountainous and inaccessible. The equipment is too diverse and unless a well oiled machinery is put in place, quality MRO support will not be possible. The model of best MRO support for the land systems is a ‘real challenge’. It is this very challenge which will be attempted to be addressed in this article at a policy level.

Success Impediments

Lot of disruptions have been introduced in war fighting, type of equipments to be used in the battle and therefore there is a need of a different way of providing MRO support. The conventional way of our equipment being supported for all domains of MRO has outlived its utility and therefore a new approach is needed.

While we are aware of the terms of Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) and Mean Time to Repair (MTTR), these have not been realistically  linked with operational conditions. Start point for effective MRO support during operations is detailed mission planning in which the mission profile of each equipment is firmed up and shared with the maintainers to prepare the equipment accordingly. For example, if a battle is likely to last for ‘X’ days and based on assessed nature of the engagement, if an equipment say a MMG is expected to fire 10,000 rounds, it is a must that quality MRO almost guarantees that the user is assured of no faults/stoppages during the fire till at least 5000 rounds or X/2 days. And this has to be done for each equipment of the Land systems. In this way, a mission assurance indicator has to be developed before MTBF and MTTR kicks in a conventional manner. Alternatively, the term MTBF has also to incorporate the ‘Mission Non-Disruption Index(MNDI)’ in its ambit where besides the time, functional capability related assurance can also be given. Its absence at the moment is one of the most important success impediments. 

It also needs to be realised that one approach does not fit all the equipments. The approach of generalisation for similar MRO support in all terrain and weather conditions even for the same  equipment is also not viable. Structuring specific MRO within a non- tailored MRO support organisation also becomes a success impediment in the MRO domain. 

The peace training profile also has a negative impact for MRO support during war. Firing at Ranges and raising a hand when a stoppage occurs during the firing expecting the armourer support also needs a review. The user has to be given the right to repair for which he/she has to be skilled besides   being vested with the authority to do so. Peace time training beyond the Academies & Training centres has to be quite akin to the battle field conditions as only then the current success impediment will be removed.

The current MRO support also suffers from the segmented approach and full spectrum maintenance is missing. MRO has to encompass all those facets needing to keep the equipment mission reliable and not to be looked only from the ‘maintainer perspective’ alone. Absence of full spectrum maintenance is thus another success impediment. 

Trusting and value assignment to the own organisation is a continuous process. While there will be continuous need of modernisation, induction of new equipment for MRO support and  transfer of legacy knowledge in an institutionalised frame work is also important. Not only this, the user should be willing to infuse capital expenditure in organisations like Base Workshops as against making them near redundant in GOCO model. It needs to be noted while routine and periodic maintenance, repair and overhaul are okay but once the equipment has lived more than two third of its assessed life, it must come for ‘Reset Maintenance’ including upgrades, the user at this point of time should  be willing to spend close to 40% of the acquisition cost as the equipment will become almost new on all operational performance parameters and in a way, it will cost less than a half against procurement of a new equipment. This facet will otherwise remain a success impediment in the MRO domain. 

Changes in the MRO Eco-System

Some of the success impediments to an efficient MRO model for Land Systems have been covered above though there are many more. With Make in India, Aatmanirbhar Bharat and possibility of ‘Maintain in India’  also becoming a near reality in days to come, some eco-systems in MRO domain have undergone major positive changes. The changed or the the changing eco-system is more conducive to structuring of an efficient MRO set up for the Land Systems for Indian Army (IA). Some of the changes in the emerging eco-system are covered below:

• Enhancing Indigenous Component/Equipment: The Land systems will invariably have a mixed profile of equipment in all the domains of the equipment viz some percentage of the old equipment say 35%, some percentage of the current equipment say 45% and some percentage of future equipment say 20%. These percentages are not sacrosanct and will keep varying from equipment to equipment. Two actions of the Government- One on ban of imported equipment in the category of negative list ( three such lists have been notified till now containing more than 1200 items/components/sub systems/equipment) and second also coming out with three lists taken up for indigenisation containing more than 300 items/components/equipments. With clear focus, the Indian Army will see a surge in indigenous component as imports will be reduced and even for previously imported equipment, subcomponents will be indigenised and in the process, there will be an increased share of indigenous equipment in the inventory of Land systems. Ideally, the best MRO can be configured when we reach a status of 100% indigenisation but till then, the current eco system gives better opportunity for structuring MRO for  the Land systems in the IA.
• Increasing Role of Private Sector: This is amongst one the biggest changes happening in India. Defence sector has so far been ‘untouchable’ for the Private Sector despite the world having allowed substantial scope of contribution for this sector. Private sector is now a welcome participant in defence manufacturing as well as in all other domains where it can make contribution. Be it aircraft, ships, guns or any other equipment like drones, it has started making in roads. All stake holders now realise that the private sector is as security conscious as those who are in the uniform. Defence forces in a democratic country under the control of civilian government should not have any reservations from the private sector. As their role increases and stakes become higher, they will be equally committed for the national cause. Certain policy enablers can be put in place to address certain concerns like they being part of fighting in the front areas where their equipment is deployed or contract responsibility continues. Contract compliance will always remain a challenge both during peace as well as war. Despite such constraints, increasing indigenous share is conducive for MRO of Land systems more so when private sector is keen to enter in this domain provided their Return on Investment (ROI) is taken care of. Provision of funds for R&D, support for start ups, participation of academia and making defence resources available are positive indicators for Private sector and an enabling environment for MRO for Land systems especially when a level playing field is being planned to be offered.
• Acceptance of Outsourcing: IA is becoming naturalised with outsourcing practices that too in the civil domain. This leverages their capacities and reduce the need of the support from those components which are used less frequently. It’s operational connect has to be thought through so that it does not remain restricted to peace time functioning. 
• Increasing Potential for MSME: Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises (MSME) is being empowered and being given increasing role in the defence production. Not only for the indigenous production, they have a huge potential for foreign OEMs and their subsidiaries in India to manufacture the components to meet the offset clause. In the process, they not only offer large employments but make a meaningful contribution in the CNP of the country. They can play a very important role in the provision of MRO for the Land systems. 
• Enhancing OEM Support: OEMs are now more aware that follow up MRO support role is critical more so for major equipments having substantial life span and which are cost intensive. They are more than willing as compared to previous times to establish MRO hubs or becoming a partner in such a support. This will become a great enabler for MRO of the Land systems in IA.

And there are many more pragmatic changes which will facilitate to create a vibrant MRO eco-system for the Land systems in IA. It is also true that a lot of changes are still needed to ensure that MRO support results in enhancing life of the equipment, ensures mission reliability and does all this at an affordable cost.

Executive Recommendations

Having dwelled on the background of MRO support expressing the need to take it at strategic level, having identified the important impediments for its success and realising that the current eco-system is more adept to adopt the MRO systems for the Land systems in the IA, its now most critical part to  come up with policy recommendations in the executive domain.

MRO policy, structures and norms will be dependant on the kind of national capability one wishes to create for IA as that will translate into the type and quantum of Land systems to be supported by the proposed MRO regime. The following assumption is made for capability creation irrespective of the fact whether the confrontation remains on the lines of LOC engagements, uncontested deployments like the one continuing in Eastern Ladakh, skirmishes like the one which happened in Galwan, local conflicts or a full spectrum war, capability creation will be needed for the worst case scenario. MRO structures will also need to be prepared for full scale escalatory response. 

The following assumptions may hold good:

1. Conventional conflict under the overhang of nuclear threat but below nuclear confrontation.
2. Collusive threat of China and Pakistan.
3. Localised threat to full spectrum war.
4. Support to friendly countries to avert their threats.
5. International deployment of forces with/without UN mandate in the national interest.
6. Conflict duration for ab-initio resource creation- 90 days after which surge capacity for another 90 days which gets progressively created in the initial 90 days of the conflict.

Having assumed the capability needed for the Land systems, MRO support also needs to be structured accordingly. The following policy recommendations could facilitate:

• Tri-Services Approach. Though current deliberation is primarily for MRO of  Land systems but Tri-services approach is a must and must emerge for MRO as early as possible not only to save overheads but also to leverage each others strengths. Theaterisation and related plans do envisage these and hopefully these will be implemented on priority.
• Combat Zone Responsibility/TBA Responsibility. The responsibility in Combat Zone (not clearly defined and being used for TBA covering the areas from the front lines till the rear  boundary of the Corps) for MRO must rest with the combatants whereas it can be shared between combatants & Public/Private in all other areas.
• Directorate of Aatmanirbhar. While the requisite impetus is being given by all the Government agencies on Aatmanirbhar Bharat, there are certain challenges which need to be resolved by a nodal agency. This proposed organisation can be a single point contact for all the aspects. The current Army Design Bureau (ADB) as well as DGQA need to be be subsumed in this in addition to the Directorate of Standardisation. Government has already come out with certain standards and wherever these have been notified, these have to be mandatorily preferred over other/international standards. Similarly, an enabling provision is needed for the certification of the products of foreign OEMs produced indigenously by the Indian agencies to speed up the adoption as well as to avoid exploitation
• Public-Private Partnership. This has to be the most important constituent of a vibrant and futuristic MRO support set up  for Land systems in IA. In addition to sharing the load, as we advance towards more indigenisation; design, build, maintain and operate models have to emerge as integration of Public- Private partnerships are must for the capability creation as visualised. It also becomes more important as India focuses on export of the defence equipment and therefore MRO support will need to be extended to these countries as well. The following aspects are important:

• Large No of maintainers are retiring early adding to pension burden for long time. They can be made available to the Private sector as combatants wherein their wages are paid by the user and capacity created in the Private sector is used in the IA as well as for MRO support in the other countries. If there are reservations on this model, Indian Veteran Corps can be created and such capacities then be shared with the private sector.
• Sharing the process and specs with the private sector is essential. While confidential equipment as well as MRO of main ordnance must remain with combatants, balance must be outsourced/ given to the private sector.
• Broad distribution of responsibility for MRO for Land systems could be:

• TBA and confidential equipment as well as ordnance irrespective of place- Combat maintainers.
• Homegrown equipment- Public sector/PPP model.
• Foreign OEMs -PPP  model .
• In all cases of PPP model, a skeleton set up of combat maintainers must be embedded.

• Promoting own OEMs. There are large No of industrialists who wish to enter the defence manufacturing. Their handholding is a must and should be done in a transparent manner. An enabling policy needs to be enunciated. The OEMs needing role in MRO domain must be supported. Army skeleton organisation could be part of such OEMs besides sharing of infrastructure, resources & processes for a  win-win model. Handholding for identified equipments should keep expanding.
• Base Workshops as PSUs. Since basic infrastructure and skill set is available, these must be functioning now  as PSUs. Assembly lines and test stations should be modified. Digital technology should be adopted. In the process, these will bring qualitative surge in the MRO support. In case of overhauls like guns/ A vehicles, if capacity is a constraint then either the capacity should be enhanced or private sector be co-opted to ensure that user has mission reliable equipment always and every time. Aggressive timings for overhaul as well as reset maintenance must be laid down. 
• Civil Incorporation in the Battlefield. While MRO support in combat zone has been recommended to be with the combatants but there are other difficult areas where civilian support will be needed. They have to be physically fit, mentally robust and motivated to function in a hostile environment. In addition to Official Secret Act, other enabling Acts may be inserted, if considered appropriate.
• In Situ Repairs. Majority of the Land systems will need to be part of conflict on sustained basis. Their absence from the active battle may be disastrous as replacement equipment provisioning has its own challenges. It is therefore must that MRO support provided should be able to handle the ‘in situ’ repair in most of the cases. Expertise and spare support should ensure this. Rearward movement of the equipment should be an exception rather than rule.
• MRO Friendly Upgrades. Due to longivity of the equipment and costs involved, the equipment has to be sustained through upgrades. Upgrades planned should be MRO friendly rather than being too complex.
• Sensorisation. It is common with advancing technology that health of an equipment can be objectively measured and therefore predictive maintenance can be undertaken much before the equipment becomes ‘off road’. While sensorisation of defence equipment is positive development but networking of these for operational purpose should not be undertaken as malware may infect which will result in catastrophic results.

And there are many more facets which will need to be factored as MRO support will need to be theatre and equipment specific. Its contours will keep undergoing changes once the quantum of indigenisation enhances, variety of the equipment reduces and PPP model is empowered.

Summary

MRO set up  for Land systems in IA is pretty complex. There are a lot of impediments to it’s success. The current eco-system is moving in the desired direction but much more needs to be done. MRO for Land systems are not that ROI friendly as is the case for aviation and naval sector. This may result in larger shouldering by the combatants and internal organisation. A clear cut policy has to be evolved for futuristic MRO support once capability parameters have been decided. Some policy suggestions have been given based on the assumed conflict scenario.

Note

The article has been crafted from a round table discussion carried under the aegis of MROdigestforums.

Combat-Stamina